Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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e e	Soviet	Naval	Acti	vity	Outside	Home	Waters	During	1984

Summa ry

NGA, NAVY Reviews Completed

Soviet naval presence outside home waters traditionally has involved only a fraction of the Soviet Navy and this remains true today. It has been steadily increasing, however, and in 1984 reached its highest level ever.

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In addition, the transformation of Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam into a true overseas base for the Soviet Navy is a major change from the transitory and small-scale use of overseas facilities that has been characteristic of Soviet naval operations outside home waters. The buildup of air strength at Cam Ranh into a regimental-size composite air unit—with strike, fighter, reconnaissance, ASW, and support aircraft—has dramatically increased the presence of Soviet naval aviation deployed outside the USSR. An increased number of surface combatants and general purpose submarines at Cam Ranh form the core of a naval squadron. The Soviets also are continuing to renovate and construct support facilities there, permitting expanded services for air and naval units and probably easing the burden placed on their auxiliary ships.

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
Soviet naval presence has become more robust in several regions:

It increased sharply in the open Pacific Ocean, with nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, general purpose submarines, and hydrographic and space event support ships accounting for most of the increase.


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° A three-year dec 1984 with an inc	roups visited Cuba s helicopter carrie line in the size of rease in the averag urface combatants d	the Indian Ocean	Squadaen ended :
In the open Atlanti remained about the same, surface and subsurface u IL-38 ASW aircraft to Li	and only in the me	diterranean did the	e level of
Peacetime missions to range from showing-the naval forces. As the outvalue in support of wart is particularly true of the China Sea. They could diallied forces that could bases, and its higher value.	t-of-area forces be ime missions of the the expanded force ivert, delay, and p	Id ports to monitor come more numerous, Soviet Navy is incand support present erhaps even destroy	ring Western their potential creasing. This in the South some US and
General Pattern of Soviet	. Naval Deployments		
1. The Soviet naval percent over that of 1983 most ever. (We use the yship away from home water those of preceding years Ship-days in the open Pacincreased slightly in the and remained stable off WSea. Two task groupsinthe Caribbean in 1984.	presence outside he, to nearly 62,000 early tabulation of s for one dayto cand to identify chaific registered a second and to compare the second se	ship-days spent ou ship-days-the prompare deployment nges in deployment harp increase36% outh China Sea, and	t of area, the esence of one levels with patterns.) Ship-days Indian Ocean Mediterranean and operated in
Soviet Naval Aviation			25X1
2. Soviet Naval Aviante USSR rose dramatically a composite naval air reg	ation (SNA) aircraf y in 1984more tha iment at Cam Ranh B	n doubling-due to	the build up of
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
Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters, by Region, 1965 - 1984




Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters, by Type, 1974 - 1984



Total Naval Aviation Out of Area Deployment Days 1976 - 1984



Overseas Deployment of Soviet Naval Aviation 1976 - 1984



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more frequent IL-38 ASW aircraft deployments to Libya and Syria. Deployment days for Soviet naval aircraft in the Indian Ocean dropped significantly in 1984. Aircraft days decreased slightly in Cuba, but increased in Angola.	
3. In recent years, the Soviets have demonstrated a more sustained, active, and proficient use of naval aircraft in distant areas. In 1984, the presence of naval aircraft in Vietnamas measured in days of aircraft presencesurpassed the previous peak established in Egypt in the early 1970s. The Soviets continue to diversify the air order-of-battle at Cam Ranh, adding fighters, bombers, and various support aircraft as they gradually increase the inventory.	
4. Growth of naval aviation deployments occurred on a smaller scale in the Mediterranean region in 1984. There was an increase in the number of IL-38 deployments to both Libya and Syria. The deployments have become more diversified in 1985 with a combination of IL-38 deployments to Libya and TU-16 Badger reconnaissance aircraft staging to Syria. This marked the first visits of Badgers to the region since a single previous visit to Syria in 1981 and the routine presence of these aircraft in Egypt in the 1970s.	
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6. The increased presence and activity probably have contributed to a rise in proficiency. Although losses of SNA aircraft still occasionally occur overseas, Soviet units continue to expand gradually their operational areas in most regions where they deploy. This evolution probably will continue as the Soviets experiment with the use of naval aviation in a variety of missions in distant areas.	
Regional Presence and Activities	25 X 1
South China Sea	
7. During 1984, the Soviets built their forces in the South China Sea into a naval squadron while they renovated or constructed new shore facilities in Vietnam. The level of surface combatants nearly doubled during the year, although the total number of ship days in the region increased by only two	
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Measuring Soviet Naval Presence

Ship days are the most convenient measure of Soviet naval presence outside home waters, but they can be misleading unless several considerations are taken into account:


- Yearly statistics include the large percentage of noncombat ships that the Soviets maintain abroad. Many naval auxiliaries, such as yard craft, repair ships, and submarine tenders are included in the ship-day count. In 1984, nearly 40 percent of Soviet ship days represented such auxiliary ships and craft. Another 14 percent are accounted for by research vessels and missile testing and space support ships.
- Our figures do not differentiate between days at sea and those spent in foreign ports or sheltered anchorages.
- Ships in transit for sea trials or interfleet transfer are counted, although they may perform only limited operational functions or none at all.
- The Soviet Navy must commit ships to maintenance before, after, and sometimes during overseas deployments to maintain out-of-area force levels. Thus the ship-day count does not reflect the total time involved in supporting distant naval operations.
- Soviet out-of-area deployments attract significant attention, yet on a daily average they involve under 10 percent of the Soviet Navy. In 1984 the Navy deployed on a daily average 19 surface combatants and about 31 general purpose submarines-only about 6 percent of the combatant inventory and about 10 percent of the general purpose submarines.

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
Soviet Ship-Days in the South China Sea (Without the Pacific Ocean), 1983 - 1984




percent, in part because the 13 percent reduction in aux occurred late in the year atotals.	iliary ship days. In addi	tion, the buildup	25X1
8. The squadron now about three or four are bas transit to or from the Indimissile-equipped patrol comauxiliaries usually are pre-	an Ocean. Four small ASW batants, two coastal mines	two are there during ships, two weepers, and a number of	
frigates during transit to submarines, small combatant core of what appears to be	or from the Indian Ocean. s, ASW ships, and the coas	The three to four tal minesweepers form the] 25 X 1
9. The Soviets continupgrading POL storage and woonstruction—barracks, stoon Cam Ranh peninsula in su	rage and other buildings	new at a number of l <u>ocations</u>	25X1
•	r to have formed at Cam Ra four Bear F ASW aircraft, Badger bombers and suppor on and new construction at ve established minor maint	nh a composite air two to four Bear D t aircraft, and 14 the airfield is enance facilities,	25X1
11. The Soviets have missile-equipped naval comb occur. The deployment of mould be a logical next step of all four Soviet fleets a	obile surface-to-surface op; coastal defense missile	t, and more additions may coastal defense missiles as defend the homewaters	25X1
12. Soviet auxiliarie in Ho Chi Minh City, while afloat auxiliaries continue refuelling naval-subordinat increased in 1984four use	d in Cam Ranh Bay. Soviet ed oilers supporting the S	ir activities provided by use of Singapore for outh China Sea squadron	25X1
13. The naval base at Cam Ranh Bay contrasts with the traditional impermanence of Soviet out-of-area presence since their expulsions from Egypt and Somalia. Soviet air and naval facilities at Cam Ranh continue to grow and take on the appearance of permanence; most air and naval units_routinely			
			25X1
	5		25X1

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present appear to be deplo	oyed either permanently or until repair and overhaul	7
		25X1
strength of the Pacific Fl defending the critical sea potentially could aid this operations in the South Ch Ranh during war with the w permanence of the faciliti	forces at Cam Ranh reducesat least initiallythe eet available to carry out the primary mission of approaches to the USSR. The forces at Cam Ranh mission in an indirect manner, however, through aina Sea region. If units stand and fight at Cam Westas implied by the diversification and les and forces therethey could delay, divert, or imately needed for higher priority missions.	
Pacific Ocean		25X1
percent. The major incread days reflect more numerous the US West Coast, as well	rea ship days in the open Pacific increased 36 use was in submarine days. The increased submarine us patrols of SSBNs and some general purpose units off us increased numbers of general purpose submarines us South China Sea and Indian Ocean.	25X1
unprecedented and nearly-c away from traditional patr	t SSBN patrols close to the US west coast include ontinuous forward deployments of Delta-class SSBNs ol areas close to the USSR. The Soviets have also their Y-class deployments off the US west coast.	25 X 1
Indian Ocean		
in 1984 when the force the submarines were usually pr combatants were usually the about 25% more time in the and one or two amphibious	line in the size of the Indian Ocean Squadron ended re increased slightly. Two general purpose resent in 1984, up one from 1983, and three surface were instead of two to three. Research ships spent region, while the presence of a mine warfare ship ships remained stable. Auxiliary ship presence 13 vessels on the average.	5X1
at the austere Soviet nava the Red Sea or in South Ye anchorages off Socotra Isl	nnits continue to spend most of their time at anchor all support facility at Ethiopia's Dahlak Island in meni waters, either in Aden harbor or at the and. Port calls are made to littoral states, alles in support of the Rene regime.	25 X 1
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	25X1	


Soviet Ship-Days in the Pacific Ocean (Without the South China Sea), 1983 - 1984



Total Soviet Ship-Days in the Pacific Ocean and South China Sea, 1974 - 1984



Soviet Ship-Days in the Indian Ocean, 1974 - 1984



Airfield, South Yemen, down from four routinely present before 1984. The Soviets have not sent IL-38s back to Asmera, Ethiopia since two aircraft routinely deployed there were damaged or destroyed by a rebel attack on the airfield in May 1984.
21. A combined Soviet-Ethiopian naval exercise was held for the first time in May 1984, and it may have included participation by the South Yemeni Navy. Several Soviet units, including an F-class diesel attack submarine and IL-38s from Ethiopian airfields, participated along with four Ethiopian ships.
22. The first deployment of a K-class diesel-powered torpedo attack submarine to the region occurred from July to October 1984. The two submarines present most often are one dieseleither F-class or K-classand one nuclear-powered guided missile unit, either a C-class or Mod-E-II-class. More K-class patrols in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean can be expected as more units of this class enter the Pacific Fleet.
23. During August, a Soviet task force, which included the Moskva-class helicopter carrier Leningrad, two minesweepers, and additional combatants and auxiliaries arrived in response to the Red Sea mining incidents. Some mine hunting operations may have been carried out in South Yemeni waters and in the Red Sea, but overall the task group was generally inactive. Its main units departed through the Suez Canal in early November. The presence of the group helped boost the ship-day count for combatants and kept the ship-days total for mine warfare ships stable, although previously routine patrol operations by a Soviet mine warfare unit in the Strait of Hormuz were maintained only sporadically during the year.

	25X1
27. No new Soviet naval use of facilities in the Seychelles has occurred despite Soviet donations of fuel oil and assistance in refurbishing and maintaining dilapidated fuel storage tanks. The number of Soviet port calls to Victoria was reduced in 1984. Nonetheless, President Rene's insecurity and ongoing Soviet efforts to play on his concerns may result in some privileges such as occasional landing rights for Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft or occasional use of fuel storage tanks.	
28. Several port calls to Mauritius were made in 1984, mainly by oceanographic research ships. Soviet relations with Madagascar soured in 1984	25X1
and early 1985. President Ratsiraka permitted US naval auxiliaries to make port calls in April 1984 and in March 1985 in order to provide humanitarian	
assistance after natural disasters but has since denied a Soviet request for a ship visit.	25X1
	25X1
29. The Indian Ocean Squadron provides a small but visible threat to Western naval forces. The nuclear-powered cruise missile or torpedo attack submarine on patrol in the Arabian Sea serves as the main threat to the US carrier battlegroup there, short of a massive attack by long range aircraft from bases in the southern USSR. The diesel submarine in the region also provides a second threat to Western forces and shipping. The IL-38 aircraft in South Yemen support the submarines with reconnaissance against the carrier group or other targets and ASW screening missions to attempt to detect enemy	
	25 X 1
8	

submarines following the Soviet units. The Soviet surface combatants, auxiliaries, and amphibious ships would be of more limited use in the area during hostilities with the West. They could be withdrawn before hostilities or be sacrificed in support of submarine operations. The squadron lacks sustainability in wartime because Dahlak Island is lightly defended and without weapons storage facilities. The squadron could be reinforced with several submarines from Cam Ranh Bay, but this would only aggravate logistic weaknesses and divert resources from what might be the more critical campaign in the Pacific. The few Soviet submarines in the Indian Ocean could conduct operations of limited duration against sea lines of communication (SLOC).

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Atlantic/Caribbean

30. Two task groups transited the Atlantic Ocean to visit Cuba in 1984. instead of the usual one. A Soviet task group arrived in the Caribbean in March and consisted of the Moskva-class helicopter carrier Leningrad, an Udaloy-class destroyer, an F-class diesel-attack submarine, and a naval tanker. The Leningrad is the first helicopter carrier sent to Cuba by the Soviets, and the task group's arrival marked the first visit to the Caribbean by an Udaloy-class ship, the Soviet Navy's newest and most capable antisubmarine warship.

25X1

25X1

 The second group arrived in Cuba on 28 December 1984 for a stay of almost two months. The group was made up of a Sovremennyy-class guided missile destroyer, two frigates, a T-class diesel attack submarine, and an oiler. It represented the 24th Soviet deployment of a task group to Cuba since 1969 and marked the first deployment of a Sovremennyy-class ship to the region.

25X1

25X1

Other highlights of the deployment included the transit through the Caribbean south of Jamaica--the first time the Soviets have ventured into those waters with surface combatants. Bear D reconnaissance_and_Bear_F_ASW aircraft continued to deploy to Cuba during the year.

32. The Soviets also continued their increased deployment of submarines off the US east coast. Beginning in December 1983, older E-II nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) engaged in patrols varying 30 to 60 days in length off the US.

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In January 1984, Delta-I and Delta-II SSBNs began patrolling closer to the US in areas previously associated with Yankee-I patrols. On 8 April 1984, the Soviets began more frequent patrols of Yankee-class SSBNs closer to the US

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
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
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Soviet Ship-Days in the Atlantic Ocean, 1976 - 1984




Soviet Ship-Days in the Caribbean Sea 1974 - 1984




33. The primary advantage to the Soviets of these deployments is to reduce missile flight times. Submarines deployed in these areas, however, are more vulnerable to US ASW forces than they would be if they were operating in the bastions and continued deployments of this sort could cause difficulties in SSBN scheduling and maintenance.	25 X 1
34. The initial deployments may have been intended mainly for political rather than military reasons as a Soviet reaction to US missile deployments in Europe. Nonetheless, the presence of the E-II off the US coasts probably is a precursor of eventual routine deployment of Soviet land-attack cruise missilesthe SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24to waters near the US.	25X1
Mediterranean Sea	
35. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron has had a recognizable wartime mission against Western naval forces in the region since its inception. Force levels in the Squadron have not changed dramatically in recent years. In 1984, however, the ship-days of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron fell by over 10 percent. This reduction probably is due to the cessation of unusual US military activity in the eastern Mediterranean, especially off Lebanon. The presence of amphibious shipswhich doubled in 1983 with one Alligator or two Polnocnys kept at anchor in the eastern Mediterranean, probably for a contingency evacuation rolewas sporadic in 1984.	25X1
36. The use of Libya and Syria for periodic deployment of ASW and reconnaissance aircraft has given the Soviets an improved monitoring capability in the eastern and central Mediterranean. Soviet access to these airfields during the opening stages of war would be a particularly valuable, although exposed, asset. Deployment of IL-38 ASW aircraft to Libya and Syria became more routine in 1984four deployments to Libya and four to Syria during the year.	25X1
	25 X 1
37. The Soviets continue to use ports in Syria, Libya, and occasionally Algeria and Tunisia for limited repair and maintenance of combatants in the Mediterranean. Tunisia granted access for a Soviet F-class submarine in August after denying Soviet requests since they were last given docking privileges in the late 1970s. Maintenance work for Soviet units in regional ports and shipyards provides valuable support for the Mediterranean Squadron as well as providing some alternatives to using overcrowded shipyards in the USSR.	25X1
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Soviet Ship-Days in the Mediterranean Sea 1974 - 1984




38. There was little change in the size of the Soviet naval patrol off West Africa in 1984. A diesel attack submarine was present in the region for more than half the yearup from the two-month submarine deployment there in 1983. A surface combatant and/or an amphibious ship remained present in Luanda throughout the year, supported by auxiliaries and Soviet naval technicians ashore. The Soviet fisheries protection patrol of one or two minesweepers continued to operate out of Conakry, Guinea. 39. The amount of time spent by TU-95 Bear D naval reconnaissance aircraft in Angola increased in 1984. They maintained the usual low level of activity while deployed, however, and at least some of the increase in time was due to mechanical problems and bad weather delaying scheduled returns to Cuba.	25X1 25X1
	25X1
41. The Soviet naval presence off West Africa normally does not present a credible threat to the West in the event of war. Bear D reconnaissance aircraft deployed to Luanda in wartime would be unable to reach the major cross-Atlantic sealanes to be used by US forces and shipping. If a diesel-powered attack submarine was deployed to the region and remained during hostilities, it could conduct limited anti-SLOC missions against merchant shipping, although it would lack adequate logistic support and ordnance reloads.	25X1
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	25X1

Soviet Ship-Days Off West Africa 1976 - 1984




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